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“Innovation, by its nature, does not always fit within existing
structures.”
—Turo CEO, Andre Haddad1
INTRODUCTION
Airbnb, Uber, Eatwith, and other sharing economy2 platforms
facilitate short-term rentals, transportation, meals, and even petsharing. The platforms in the sharing economy use technology to
connect people who have private excess capacity to those who want to
purchase it. Rather than staying in a hotel, customers can stay in a
spare bedroom through Airbnb; rather than hiring moving
companies, customers can get help moving via TaskRabbit; rather
than going to a restaurant, customers can have a meal prepared for
them in someone’s home via Eatwith.
TIME Magazine listed the sharing economy as one of the ten ideas
that will change the world,3 and Forbes estimates that the revenue
flowing through the sharing economy surpassed $3.5 billion in 2013,
with growth exceeding twenty-five percent per year.4 At that rate,
peer-to-peer sharing has moved beyond a fringe movement and into a
disruptive economic force. Look only to Airbnb, which at six years

1. Andre Haddad, New York Rentals Suspended Until Further Notice, TURO
BLOG (May 15, 2013), https://blog.turo.com/news/new-york-rentals-suspended-untilfurther-notice [https://perma.cc/HA8S-K938].
2. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST
COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economylacks-a-shared-definition#8 [perma.cc/4UNG-29F2] (explaining that the “sharing
economy” goes by many names, such as “collaborative consumption,” “the peer-topeer economy,” and “the 1099 economy”). This Article uses the term “sharing
economy” to refer to the peer-to-peer networks facilitated by platforms that allow
people to profit from their excess capacity.
3. Bryan Walsh, Today’s Smart Choice: Don’t Own. Share, TIME (Mar. 17,
2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0%2C28804%2C2059521_2059
717_2059710%2C00.html.
4. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Sharing Economy,
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnband-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/.
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old had a valuation of $13 billion,5 much higher than the Hyatt hotel
chain ($7 billion),6 and Uber, which at four years old had a valuation
of $40 billion, greater than Hertz,7 Avis,8 and Enterprise9 combined.10
Companies using this relatively new business model have faced
innumerable legal challenges. In some places, platforms are simply
banned from operating;11 in others, supply-side users12 or the
platforms themselves are fined.13 The reason for the difficulty and
uncertainty is that the sharing economy is in a “betwixt and between
space”—it does not fit within existing legal frameworks. Platforms
view themselves as online companies regulated by Internet law,
though they execute mostly in the offline world.14 Furthermore,

5. Ankit Ajmera, Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee Stock
Sale: WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/usairbnb-financing-idUSKCN0ID03420141024#yCEcMQMVTAZeIx6w.97
[perma.cc/L6YH-8GR5].
6. Hyatt
Hotels
Selected
Fundamentals,
MACROAXIS,
http://www.macroaxis.com/invest/ratio/H—Current-Valuation
[perma.cc/G4WXSVLW].
7. Hertz
Global
Holdings,
Inc.,
YAHOO!
FIN.,
https://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=HTZ+Key+Statistics (last visited May 25, 2015).
8. Avis
Budget
Group
Inc.,
MARKETWATCH,
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/car (last visited May 20, 2015).
9. America’s Largest Private Companies: #16 Enterprise Holdings, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/companies/enterprise-holdings/ (last visited May 20, 2015).
10. Note these valuations have been hotly contested. See generally Sarah Cannon
& Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win Over
Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-andthe-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/ [perma.cc/2W58-3KMK]; Neil Irwin,
Can Uber Live Up to Its $40 Billion Valuation, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/upshot/ubers-real-challenge-leveraging-thenetwork-effect.html?_r=1&abt=0002&abg=0; Maxwell Wessel, Making Sense of
Uber’s $40 Billion Valuation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/12/making-sense-of-ubers-40-billion-valuation [perma.cc/G7R4V7XA].
11. For example, Little Rock, AK; Las Vegas, NV; and Portland, OR, have
banned Uber. Laurie Kulikowski, Uber Banned in 5 U.S. Cities That Want Your
Taxi Business, MAINSTREET (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.mainstreet.com/article/uberbanned-in-5-us-cities-that-want-your-taxi-business/page/2 [perma.cc/5TQN-WBCF].
12. Throughout this Article, the term “supply-side user” refers to the providers of
services via the sharing platforms.
13. See Ron Lieber, A $2,400 Fine for an Airbnb Host, N.Y. TIMES (May 21,
2013),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/a-2400-fine-for-an-airbnbhost/?_r=0 [perma.cc/BR6P-4JDA]; Edward Russo, Register-Guard: City Fines Uber
Over
Licensing
Violation,
OPB
(Nov.
20,
2014)
http://www.opb.org/news/article/register-guard-eugene-fines-uber-over-licensingviolation/ [perma.cc/4MW7-29TX].
14. Claire C. Miller, Is Owning Overrated? The Rental Economy Rises, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/upshot/is-owningoverrated-the-rental-economy-rises.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&abt=0002&abg=0.
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sharing economy platforms are facilitating transactions that have
always been legal but are now executed on such a large scale that the
potential for harm to the public is very real. What are the rules when
the lines blur between giving a friend a ride to the airport and
operating as a professional driver?
This Article argues that existing laws cannot effectively regulate
the sharing economy because the sharing economy is uniquely
comprised of individuals profiting from their personal excess capacity.
These individuals operate microbusinesses, which cannot, without
devastating consequences, be regulated like traditional businesses.
This Article proposes a shift in liability rules to mitigate the harm
caused by market defects in the sharing economy.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I outlines the evolution
of the sharing economy, its benefits, and two sharing economy
platforms, Airbnb and Uber. Part II defines the sharing economy and
describes the current regulatory environment governing it. Part III
proposes a method to achieve many of the goals of regulation in a
manner that balances protection of users, consumers, and existing
businesses with the need to support innovation and microbusiness.
The Article concludes with recommendations for further research.
I. THE DISRUPTIVE EVOLUTION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
Humans have always exchanged goods and services. However,
new sharing economy markets enabled by technology and the free
flow of information present a new form of market that is difficult to
conceptualize.15 The sharing economy is a disruptive force that
facilitates exchanges involving underutilized assets, from spaces to
skills to things, for monetary gain on a scale that would not be
achievable without modern technology.16 This system facilitates
localized production, cooperation, and the proliferation of
microbusinesses,17 which allows consumer needs to be met by a large

15. See id.
16. See Botsman, supra note 2. Note, Botsman includes nonmonetary gain in her
definition of the sharing economy, while this Article does not.
17. What
is
a
Microbusiness?,
SMALL
BIZ
CONNECT,
http://toolkit.smallbiz.nsw.gov.au/part/20/99/449 [perma.cc/AMU3-Y27U].
They
operate as microbusinesses, which are the very smallest of businesses with little
overhead and capital. See id. The owners of microbusinesses act as managers and are
responsible for all aspects of the business not outsourced to platforms. See id.
Because margins are so thin for these microbusinesses and resources are limited, they
must not be overly burdened with regulations. See id. As discussed in greater detail
in the parts below, many people are involved in the sharing economy at a micro level,
offering whatever excess capacity they personally have. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
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cross-section of society.18 This ease of access is made possible by
platform companies, which are the businesses that broker the
transactions.19
A. The Driving Forces Behind the Sharing Economy
The sharing economy in its current form began making waves at
the turn of the century.20 There are three interconnected forces that
gave rise to the sharing economy: modern trust, technology, and
economic pressure.

1.

Modern Trust

Many companies in the sharing economy facilitate behaviors that
previously would have seemed unthinkable or foolish. People are
hopping into strangers’ cars (Lyft, Sidecar, Uber), welcoming others
into their spare rooms (Airbnb), and dropping off dogs at unfamiliar
houses (DogVacay, Rover).
The sharing economy requires
individuals to trust complete strangers. Trusting strangers is not only
an economic breakthrough; it is also a cultural one “enabled by a
sophisticated series of mechanisms, algorithms, and finely calibrated
systems of rewards and punishments.”21
Notably, the concept of facilitating economic relationships by
sharing with strangers is not a newly developed concept; it is, rather, a
return to an older one. Before the Industrial Revolution, sharing was
common. It was acceptable to borrow someone’s tool, horse, or spare
bed, because Americans tended to cluster in small towns and farming
communities, where people built tight-knit relationships over the
course of many years.22 In this system, there were natural incentives
to treat people well, because if you developed a bad reputation, no
one would want to share with you.23

18. See Benita Matofska, What Is the Sharing Economy?, THE PEOPLE WHO
SHARE,
http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/
[perma.cc/CXF9-E4NK].
19. This Article does not include peer-to-peer goods-marketplaces, such as eBay,
in its definition of the sharing economy because those sites generally do not deal in
the sale or rental of personal excess capacity.
20. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-risesharing-economy [perma.cc/EJ6G-HM69].
21. Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each
Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-shareeconomy/ [perma.cc/63UV-DUB7].
22. Id.
23. Id.
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This economic system started to change around the mid-nineteenth
century. When Americans moved from small towns to cities, people
could no longer rely on interpersonal relationships or cultural norms
to safeguard their transactions, because they did not know, and often
had never met, the people with whom they were doing business.24
The result, Lynne Zucker has argued, was the destruction of trust.25
As a result of this trust shift, formal systems sprang up as proxies
for the trust that citizens had lost in one another. Between 1870 and
1920, a series of laws were enacted to establish a framework of rules
and backstops designed to produce trust. These included many
permissions-based systems of licensing, inspecting, and permitting.26
“Through institutionalizing socially created mechanisms for
producing trust,” Zucker writes, “the economic order was gradually
reconstructed.”27 The combination of laws and facilitators replaced
the “casual, intimate, interpersonal form of trust” of small towns.28
The problem, however, with this “institutionalized trust” is that it is
incredibly burdensome. Think about the hoops an entrepreneur
starting a simple granola company has to jump through just to prove
to the government that it is “ready” to operate: find or build a
commercial kitchen, secure a food establishment license, secure a
business license, secure a tax identification number, complete food
safety and sanitation training, comply with Food and Drug
Administration regulations and Department of Agriculture
regulations regarding labeling, etc.29 These regulations are designed
to ensure that the granola manufacturer will provide safe food, inform
the public about its product, pay necessary taxes, etc. All of these
ends are worthy and give consumers a strong sense that the food they
eat is safe.30

24. Id.
25. Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic
Structure 1840–1920, at 2 (RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV., Working Paper No. 82,
1986) in 8 Research in Organizational Behavior (L.L. Cummings & Barry Staw eds.,
1985).
26. Nick Grossman, White Paper: Regulation, the Internet Way, DATA-SMART
CITY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/whitepaper-regulation-the-internet-way-660 [perma.cc/8WYG-C9HK].
27. See Zucker, supra note 25, at 4.
28. See Tanz, supra note 21.
29. See generally IDAHO STATE DEP’T OF AGRIC., STARTING A SPECIALTY FOODS
BUSINESS IN IDAHO (2010).
30. Seventy-eight percent of Americans are very or somewhat confident in the
safety of the U.S. food supply. Food Insight, 2012 Food & Health Survey: Consumer
Attitudes Towards Food Safety, Nutrition & Health, INT’L FOOD INFORMATION
COUNCIL
FOUND.
(May
22,
2012),
http://www.foodinsight.org
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Peer-to-peer companies do not need such a complicated series of
regulations or assurances to build trust, because they create and
utilize what this Article calls “modern trust.” Modern trust is built on
a feedback loop system of ratings and reviews, as first utilized
effectively by eBay.31 In 1995, eBay developed a highly successful
online platform where individuals create accounts to enable the
buying and selling of items through an online auction process.32 eBay
creator, Pierre Omidyar, recognized the vast potential of the Internet
and the absence of a virtual secondhand market.33 While some of
eBay’s success could certainly be attributed to luck,34 there is no
doubt that eBay tapped unrealized potential.35 There were two needs
identified: first, the need for a place where people could buy and sell
directly from one another online, and second, the need for peerreviews and community enforceability.36
Mr. Omidyar and his eBay team quickly discovered the truth of
these needs when it became apparent that community members might
behave in a fraudulent, or simply lazy, manner. For example, in 2002,
a few short years after eBay’s launch the United States National
Fraud Information Center reported that eighty-seven percent of
complaints involved online auction transactions.37 In addition, in
2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received more than
25,000 complaints for web-based auction fraud, an increase from only
100 complaints in 1997.38
Trust had to be systematically “built in” to eBay. Therefore,
Omidyar’s team created a mechanism for a feedback loop that

/2012_Food_Health_Survey_Consumer_Attitudes_toward_Food_Safety_Nutrition_a
nd_Health#sthash.OVA320d6.dpuf [perma.cc/54WP-4SSX].
31. See ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 26–29 (2008).
32. Id. at 25.
33. See id. at 19–20.
34. See id. at 19.
35. eBay’s 2014 first quarter (April) revenue is reported as $4.26 billion, slightly
higher than the expected $4.23 billion. See Jillian D’Onfro, eBay Beats on Earnings,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Apr.
29,
2014),
Stock
down
Slightly,
http://www.businessinsider.com/ebay-q1-earnings-2014-4 [perma.cc/AA5U-V5H5].
36. Andrés Guadamuz González, PayPal and eBay: The Legal Implications of the
C2C Electronic Commerce Model, 18TH BILETA CONFERENCE: CONTROLLING INFO.
ONLINE
ENV’T
1,
2
(Apr.
2003),
IN
THE
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20papers/2003/PayPal%20and%20
eBay%20%20The%20Legal%20Implications%20of%20the%20C2C%20Elctronic%20Comm
erce%20Model.pdf [perma.cc/7R6R-HQ35].
37. See id. at 3; see also Online Auction Fraud Skyrocketing in 2002, NAT’L
CONSUMERS LEAGUE (Aug. 2002), http://www.nclnet.org/fraudweek2.htm.
38. See id. at 3.
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allowed buyers and sellers to rate one another.39 They also “began
monitoring the activity across the eBay marketplace, flagging
potentially problematic sellers or buyers, providing its own payment
options, and eventually guaranteeing every purchase.”40 In so doing,
eBay created a new system that served as a trust proxy. The new
system did not require people to trust one another, because people
could rely on a crowd-sourced, centralized system of feedback to
protect their interests.41 This trust proxy was to the Internet age what
complex business regulations, institutional banking, and insurance
were to the early twentieth century. As described in the sections
below,42 sharing economy platforms use the same centralized systems
of ratings and reviews as eBay to protect customers and create
modern trust.

2.

Technology

Technology is essential for the development of the sharing
economy in three ways: it allows for the free flow of information, it
reduces transaction costs, and it regulates behavior. Before the
advent of many of the technologies that connect our world, it was
difficult, if not impossible, to access information about excess capacity
at the individual level. For example, before an app was created that
would immediately tell you everyone in your vicinity who is willing to
give you a ride the airport, you had to call a friend or your local taxi
company, schedule a pickup, and hope the driver arrived on time.
“Our limited access to information was a structural constraint on [the]
supply for a given market.”43 It was not that people did not have
excess capacity—we always had empty spare bedrooms and back
seats—it was that there was no way to connect the people who
needed something with the people who had it.
Specifically,
technologies such as high-speed Internet, the Global Positioning
System, open data, the ubiquity and low-cost of mobile phones, and
social media made this possible.44 Sharing would struggle if it were

39. Anjanette Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute
Resolution in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 377 (2015).
40. Tanz, supra note 21.
41. Id.
42. See infra Part I.C.
43. Hutch Carpenter, Harvesting Abundance in the Sharing Economy, HYPE
INNOVATION BLOG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://blog.hypeinnovation.com/harvestingabundance-sharing-economy [perma.cc/DV7Z-PFBJ].
44. Cf. Andrew Batey, Mobile + Sharing Economy + Internet of Things = the
ENTREPRENEUR
(Sept.
22,
2014),
Coming
Economic
Boom,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237646 [perma.cc/GRY8-R8RN].
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not convenient, and sharing would never have been convenient
without the free and instantaneous flow of information that
technology made possible.
Technology also allows for the reduction in transaction costs.
Computerized systems allow for user-friendly and efficient search
functions, nearly instantaneous payment processing, and fully
integrated accounting functions among other things.
Technology also is essential for regulating participant behavior via
lex informatica. Lex informatica is the concept involving the use of
technological architectures to regulate the flow of information and
require or prohibit certain actions.45 The effect of technology on
behavior is similar to that of law and, at times, can go further,
especially when the user has no choice but to follow the rules imposed
by technology. For example, if an eBay user failed to follow through
with a transaction, she could be removed from the system.46

3.

Economic and Cultural Pressures

Economic pressures also greatly contributed to the birth of the
sharing economy. It is no coincidence that many firms in the sharing
economy were founded between 2008 and 2010, in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis. People during this time “needed new ways
to save money, as well as new ways to make it.”47 As suggested by
Kevin Roose, the depressed labor market was a precondition for the
sharing economy.48 With fewer full-time jobs, Americans were forced
to take temporary work, and the sharing economy provided many
sources of temporary or “gig” work.
Millennial49 values also have driven people toward the sharing
economy. Due in part to the impact of the recession, millennials grew
up with the mindset of preferring access over ownership—they

45. Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998).
46. See,
e.g.,
Unpaid
Item
Policy,
EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html#additional [perma.cc/NUM9WNLE].
47. Miller, supra note 14.
48. Kevin Roose, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Trust, It’s About
N.Y.
MAG.
(Apr.
24,
2014),
Desperation,
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/04/sharing-economy-is-aboutdesperation.html.
49. Millennials include individuals born after 1980. The Generations Defined,
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
5,
2014),
PEW
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/sdt-nextamerica-03-07-2014-0-06/ [perma.cc/EQ4A-VFGH].
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“share[], rent[], or pay small transaction fees for access.”50 As stated
by the co-founder and chief executive officer of Rent the Runway, a
clothing sharing company, young people “are now in a state of mind
where [they] want to acquire more experiences” as opposed to
things.51 “The 1990s ‘MTV Cribs’ show-off-how-much-money-youhave generation is over.”52
B.

Benefits of the Sharing Economy

The sharing economy is shaking existing industries. So why should
we allow it to continue? Why should we develop a new regulatory
regime to address the problems created by this new economy? The
answer lies perhaps in its overwhelming benefits to society.
Job Creation. The sharing economy creates jobs by utilizing the
existing capacity of individuals and their real and personal property.
A resolution at the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting in June 2013
stated that in the sharing economy, “companies have proven to be
engines of innovation and job creation, driving economic
development in the hearts of American cities, where joblessness is
still most pervasive.”53 Participating in the sharing economy also
enables people to be more entrepreneurial and pursue nontraditional
forms of income generation. For example, in Portland, Oregon,
“45% of Airbnb hosts are self-employed, freelancers, or part-time
workers, [and] 12% of hosts . . . have used Airbnb income to support
themselves while launching a new business.”54 Platforms themselves
are also creating jobs. “There are now 17 billion-dollar companies
with over 60,000 employees in the sharing [] economy.”55

50. Michael Costonis, Lead the Pack or Follow the Leader: Insuring Risk in the
ACCENTURE
1,
3
(2014),
Economy,
http://nstore.accenture.com/IM/FinancialServices/AccentureLibrary/data/pdf/Insurin
g_Risk_Sharing_Economy.pdf.
51. Miller, supra note 14.
52. Id.
53. Approval of Resolution in Support of Policies for Shareable Cities, U.S. Conf.
of
Mayors,
81st
Annual
Meeting
(June
2013),
http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/81st_Conference/metro18.asp [perma.cc/LX54SJY5].
54. Molly Turner, The Airbnb Community’s Economic Impact in Portland,
AIRBNB (Apr. 22, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-communityseconomic-impact-portland/ [perma.cc/M54J-PSGU].
55. Jeremiah Owyang, The Collaborative Sharing Economy Has Created 17
Billion-Dollar Companies (and 10 Unicorns), WEB STRATEGY (June 4, 2015),
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2015/06/04/the-collaborative-sharing-economyhas-created-17-billion-dollar-companies-and-10-unicorns/[perma.cc/LZ32-C65T].
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The barriers to entry in the sharing economy are also very low.
“Sharing leverages a wide variety of resources and [makes it easier to
start] small businesses,” with the outsourcing of tasks and
“innovations like shared workspaces, shared commercial kitchens,
community-financed start-ups, community-owned commercial
centers, and spaces for ‘pop-up’ businesses.”56 Anyone with a car or
free time can participate in the sharing economy. The opportunities
for individuals to create their own microbusinesses to supplement or
fully provide income are virtually unlimited.
Environmental Benefits. As for the environment, “the sharing
economy blends the world of profitability and sustainability.”57 It
minimizes manufacturing and distribution costs and reduces the need
for capital-intensive infrastructure because products are shared
locally.58 The sharing economy encourages people to reuse or recycle
goods rather than buy new ones (for example, you can swap an old
book for a different book with a swapping site).59 Furthermore, the
sharing economy discourages waste by tapping into under-utilized
assets. For example, Uber reduces the number of cars we need to
have on our roads or in our parking lots.
An additional benefit of the sharing economy is that it offers a
solution to the peak load problems that have been plaguing cities for
decades.60 Consider a city hosting the Super Bowl. It could much
more easily accommodate an onslaught of out-of-towners if
individuals were allowed to rent out their spare bedrooms, instead of
building a new set of hotels that would oversupply the market much
of the year.
Competitive pricing. Due in large part to the free flow of
information and the increase in supply, sharing economy markets

56. Janelle Orsi et al., Policies for Shareable Cities: A Sharing Economy Policy
for Urban Leaders, SHAREABLE 1, 30 (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/theselc/pages/209/attachments/original/139483
6950/policies_for_shareable_cities_selc_9_9_13.pdf?1394836950
[perma.cc/UHZ9R6BN].
57. Sara Gutterman, ‘Sharing Economy’ Will Save Our Economy and the
Environment,
ENVTL.
LEADER
(July
17,
2014),
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2014/07/17/sharing-economy-will-save-oureconomy-and-the-environment/#ixzz3K77vHFCl.
58. See id.
59. See JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING
PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIES (2012).
60. EconTalk: Michael Munger on the Sharing Economy, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY
(July 7, 2014), http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2014/07/michael_munger.html
[perma.cc/3QXJ-ELDX].
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often sell products and services at lower prices than their analogs in
the non-sharing economy.61 Yochai Benkler has provided a thorough
analysis of the “information collection cost” savings of peer-to-peer
networks, and it appears that when such networks operate in a
market, these savings accrue partly to the benefit of buyers in the
form of lower prices.62 Prices are also lowered because key business
functions are outsourced to platforms, thereby creating economies of
scale.
Greater product and service variety. Another benefit of the
sharing economy is its product and service variety.63 Because there
are so many individual microbusinesses, there is more diversity in
products and services available to meet the needs and interests of
buyers. For example, Handy is a marketplace for housecleaning and
“handyman” work,64 while TaskRabbit and Mechanical Turk let
people outsource a wide variety of tasks and services, ranging from
simple errands and chores to website design.65
As discussed, the sharing economy offers a number of advantages:
jobs, more efficient and sustainable allocation of resources, lower
prices, stronger communities, and greater access to services. Although
the benefits of the sharing economy justify “special treatment,” a new
regulatory structure must still serve the goals of regulation. The
question then becomes: How do we develop such a structure?

61. A recent survey of U.S. adults familiar with the sharing economy found that
eighty-six percent agree it makes life more affordable. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
THE SHARING ECONOMY: CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES 9 (2015),
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumerintelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [perma.cc/QL7V-YHML]; see also
Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. Bus.
Entrepreneurship
&
L.
529,
531–36
(2015),
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol8/iss2/4/; Neil Irwin, Uber, Lyft and a
Road Map for Reinventing the Ride, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/upshot/uber-lyft-and-a-road-map-forreinventing-the-ride.html?_r=0.
62. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of
the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 407–15 (2002).
63. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 2 (1985).
64. About Us, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/about [https://perma.cc/UC39BRA5].
65. How It Works, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works
Mechanical
Turk,
[https://perma.cc/U9FB-NU64];
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome [https://perma.cc/Z2SU-5V65].
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Drawbacks of the Sharing Economy

To start the process of determining appropriate regulations for the
sharing economy, drawbacks of the sharing economy must be
identified.
Consumer Safety. The sharing economy puts an enormous number
of people in inherently vulnerable positions—getting into someone’s
car, inviting someone into your home, etc. A score of high-profile
incidents over the course of the past few years have highlighted the
potential threats the sharing economy presents to consumer safety.66
For example, in 2011, an Airbnb host came home to an aggressively
ransacked apartment, finding her cash, credit cards, jewelry, and
electronics missing, as well as evidence that the thieves had
photocopied her birth certificate and social security number.67
Additionally, Lyft was the subject of a widely publicized stalking
episode involving a Lyft driver and his female passenger.68 While
sharing economy platforms certainly want to reduce the number of
these incidents, they wash their hands of responsibility for them.
Platforms are thus criticized for profiting from transactions in the
sharing economy without accepting all of their negative externalities.69
The regulatory response to safety concerns has been either to ban
sharing businesses from operating or to require them to obtain the
same permits required of their competitors in the non-sharing
economy for rooms, rides, and other services.70 For example, in early

66. In the ride-sharing arena, the consumer protection website
www.whosdrivingyou.com keeps a comprehensive list of safety incidents. See
Complete List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING YOU?,
http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents.html [perma.cc/J44M-Z36X].
67. Michael Arrington, The Moment of Truth for Airbnb as User’s Home Is
Utterly Trashed, TECHCRUNCH (July 27, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/27/themoment-of-truth-for-airbnb-as-users-home-is-utterly-trashed/
[perma.cc/XSY8TLTW].
68. See Sam Biddle, When Your Smartphone Chauffeur Becomes a Stalker,
VALLEYWAG (July 16, 2013), http://valleywag.gawker.com/when-your-smartphonechauffeur-becomesa-stalker-801080008/ [perma.cc/B526-LM4G].
69. See Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION
INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), http://greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharingeconomy [perma.cc/5UH8-BRMB].
70. See Lori Aratani, Competition from UberX, Lyft Has D.C. Taxis Crying Foul,
WASH.
POST
(May
11,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/competition-from-uberxlyft-has-dc-taxis-crying-foul/2014/05/11/5920c866-d60a-11e3-8a788fe50322a72c_story.html [perma.cc/MSN7-RWKG]; see also Rasier, LLC, Public
Service Commission of South Carolina Directive, Docket No. 2014-372-T (2015),
http://dms.psc.sc.gov/pdf/orders/5A23B2F8-155D-141F-23C07EAA18BA1E64.pdf
[perma.cc/6DJD-NSXX] (ordering Uber to cease and desist operations in South
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2014, the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles issued cease and
desist letters to both Uber and Lyft, ordering them to stop operating
their services in that state.71 Bans and permits are effective ways of
protecting consumers from harm, but they have the serious potential
to devastate sharing economy markets.
Fraud. Because the sharing economy often involves the exchange
of personal information, including credit card data, people interested
in committing fraud lurk throughout the sharing economy. For
example, HiGear, a car-sharing service focusing on luxury vehicles,
was forced to shut down in early 2012 after a criminal ring used stolen
identities and credit cards to bypass security checks and stole four
cars totaling $400,000.72 Airbnb has also seen a substantial rise in the
number of fake listings. These listings:
[F]irst target potential travelers on Airbnb by luring them into a
potential property. Using a composite of photos and details
collected from the web, they construct an ideal vacation rental in a
target market and then price it very competitively . . . [w]hen users
reach out to book the property or learn more, the host tries to
deliver links to an external site to collect booking data. There, a
credit card number is taken and the host disappears.73

It is also possible for people wanting to commit fraud to take control
of “a current account (likely through the bulk purchase of hacked
passwords) and make false listings under an unsuspecting user’s
name.”74

Carolina until a regulatory determination has been made); Katherine Driessen, RideShare Operators Gain Prized Access to Houston Airports, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 12,
2014),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/transportation/article/Ride-shareoperators-gain-prized-access-to-5889267.php
[perma.cc/A24M-F27U];
Paul
Nussbaum, PUC Approves UberX for State, Not Philadelphia, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Nov. 14, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-11-15/business/56394938_1_ridesharing-service-uberx-uber-service
[perma.cc/WQ7M-YUC6];
Andy
Vuong,
Colorado Likely First to Legislatively Authorize Ride-Share Services, DENV. POST
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_25661374/colorado-likelyfirst-legislatively-authorize-ride-share-services [perma.cc/PZT4-VQ9C].
71. Rachel Weiner, Virginia Tries to Put Brakes on Ride-Sharing Services, WASH.
POST
(May
12,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2014/06/26/65d83a3e-fc85-11e3-b1f48e77c632c07b_story.html [perma.cc/4DEA-P3AH].
72. See Sarah Perez, Luxury Car-Sharing Service HiGear Shuts Down Due to
Theft, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 1, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/01/luxury-carsharing-service-higear-shuts-down-due-to-theft/ [perma.cc/BLX7-CWA7].
73. Grant Martin, Airbnb’s Next Big Challenge Is Keeping the Scammers Away,
SKIFT (Nov. 21, 2014), http://skift.com/2014/11/21/airbnbs-next-big-challenge-iskeeping-the-scammers-away/ [perma.cc/HGA6-DCFH].
74. Id.
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Currently, platforms deter fraud based on peer-reviews and the fact
that the payments are typically only transferred to the microbusiness
after a transaction is complete. However, there is no regulatory check
on whether these systems are effective, and remedies for individuals
hurt by sharing economy fraud are typically limited to traditional
common law tort claims.
Privacy. The widespread collection and use of data helps expand
the array of services available in the sharing economy and keeps
prices low. Data about interactions is also what facilitates the
reputational feedback mechanisms that are crucial for the
development of trust among diverse and physically distant parties. As
the sharing economy becomes more “embedded into how people
work, travel . . . , and shop, the digital exhaust from those actions
creates associations and patterns that may be mined for insight,
efficiencies, or more nefarious purposes.”75
Currently, there are no specific privacy laws related to sharing
economy platforms. Therefore, contract law plays a key role, and,
typically, platforms dictate the privacy terms because consumers have
no individual bargaining power.76 For example:
Uber’s privacy policy states that the app can gather and use users’
geo-location data for a variety of purposes, including “internal
business purposes,” [even when the app is turned off]. The privacy
policy, however, does not define what these purposes are. So far,
the company has reportedly used it for tracking [thirty] of its most
“notable users” to display an activity map at a launch party. It is

75. Alex Howard, The Sharing Economy: Will Self-Regulation by Startups Suffice
TECH
REPUBLIC
(Dec.
14,
2014),
Protect
Consumers?,
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/the-sharing-economy-will-self-regulation-bystartups-suffice-to-protect-consumers/ [perma.cc/HP2H-UGSC].
76. See generally User Privacy Statement, UBER (July 15, 2015),
https://www.uber.com/legal/privacy-proposed/users/en
[perma.cc/P5DE-GBF7].
Privacy experts have also explained that Uber’s data collection practices are
excessive. Julia Horwitz & Marc Rotenberg, Privacy Rules for Uber, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-horwitz/privacy-rules-foruber_b_6304824.html [perma.cc/74AC-RBSN]. Marc Rotenberg, the President of
EPIC, and Julia Horwitz, Consumer Privacy Director at EPIC, previously warned:
The app model is also a data vacuum, gathering detailed information about
users and drivers that the company controls. Much of the data collection is
excessive. For example, . . . the Uber privacy policy [] reveals that the
company collects the IP addresses, manufacturers, and operating systems of
users’ phones. Uber collects information about the mobile web browsers
used by its customers, exchanges data with advertisers, and tracks users
across the internet.

to
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reported that these users did not know their location coordinates
were being used in such a way.77

The Washington Post also reported that an Uber job applicant was
able to access the company’s internal analytics and find the records of
a family member of a prominent politician in Washington, D.C.78
The fear of improper use of personal data is obvious and
warranted. Sharing economy data about people could be used for all
sorts of improper purposes, including corporate espionage and
manipulation of regulators. And the only real legal limitation on
platforms with regard to these one-sided terms comes from section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “Act”), which prohibits
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”79
Recently, a complaint was filed with the FTC under section 5 against
Uber.80 The complaint asks the FTC to investigate Uber’s business
practices and to stop the company from collecting unnecessary
location data under claims of “unfairness.”81 However, this complaint
is the first of its kind, and it is unclear whether or not the FTC will
take it seriously.
Microbusiness Protections. Similar to the contracts of adhesion
entered into by consumers in the sharing economy, the
microbusinesses participating in the sharing economy have very little

77. Sabreena Khalid, Privacy Concerns in the Sharing Economy: The Case of
HARV.
J.L.
&
TECH.
DIG.
(Dec.
17,
2014),
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/telecommunications/privacy-concerns-in-thesharing-economy-the-case-of-uber [perma.cc/G9X2-2YRQ].
78. Craig Timberg, Is Uber’s Rider Database a Sitting Duck for Hackers?, WASH.
POST
(Dec.
1,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/12/01/is-ubers-rider-database-a-sitting-duck-for-hackers/
[perma.cc/4FF2-6J89].
79. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). The FTC formalized its process for dealing with
unfairness claims in its 1984 Policy Statement on Unfairness and noted, “[t]o justify a
finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must
not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that
the practice produces; and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not
reasonably have avoided.” Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984); see also
15 U.S.C. § 45.
80. Complaint of Electronic Privacy Info. Center, In re Uber Technologies, Inc.,
F.T.C. (June 22, 2015), https://cbsnewyork.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/complaint.pdf
[perma.cc/3C2X-7JM4].
81. A trade practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 15 U.S.C. §
45(n); see, e.g., F.T.C. v. Seismic Entertainment Productions, Inc., Civ. No. 1:04-CV00377 (Nov. 21, 2006) (finding that unauthorized changes to users’ computers that
affected the functionality of the computers as a result of Seismic’s anti-spyware
software constituted a “substantial injury without countervailing benefits.”).
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bargaining power vis-à-vis the platforms. Most platforms in the
sharing economy do not offer benefits or protections for
microbusinesses because they view micro-entrepreneurs as
independent contractors.82 This means that microbusinesses receive
no paid sick or vacation days, 401(k) plans, health insurance, or life
insurance. As a result, workers must pay for their own benefits or do
without them. Although the Affordable Care Act does offer
individuals a way to get health insurance, many benefit packages
available are more costly than the options for corporations. As for
protections, there are no protections for microbusinesses with regard
to discrimination, on-the-job injuries, minimum wage, or collective
bargaining.83 These issues are currently being litigated in court, as
many microbusinesses are trying to claim “employee” protections.
Anticompetitive Behavior. Traditional businesses that compete
with sharing economy networks often argue that by avoiding the costs
associated with obtaining permits and complying with other
regulations that bind their competitors, sharing businesses are able to
operate at lower costs.84 In addition, some argue that the sharing
economy platforms are price-fixing by telling the individual
businesses within the sharing economy what price they can charge.85
The regulatory response to these claims of anticompetitive behavior
has generally involved revising state or local antitrust laws and
permitting laws to apply to sharing networks.86

82. Scott Kirsner, In the Sharing Economy, a Rift Over Worker Classification,
THE
BOS.
GLOBE
(Aug.
17,
2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/08/16/sharing-economy-are-workersemployees-independent-contractors/6GTpn1a735kNiM7T7k2vtO/story.html.
83. See Sharing Economy Is Turning More and More Workers into “Independent
EMERY
REDDY
(Apr.
6,
2015),
Contractors,”
https://www.emeryreddy.com/2015/04/sharing-economy-turning-workersindependent-contractors/ [perma.cc/563E-LVAE].
84. See Lori Aratani, Downtown D.C. Traffic Gridlocked as Taxi Drivers Protest
Uber,
Lyft,
Sidecar,
WASH.
POST
(June
26,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/06/25/d-c-taxi-driversstage-caravan-to-protest-uber-lyft-sidecar/ [perma.cc/ZC79-ZTJK]; The Sharing
Economy:
Boom
and
Backlash,
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
26,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21601254-consumers-and-investors-aredelighted-startups-offering-spare-rooms-or-rides-across-town
[perma.cc/ZGU776LZ].
85. Jill Priluck, When Bots Collude, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude
[perma.cc/2TVS4C45].
86. See, e.g., Andy Gavil & Chris Grengs, Getting Around Town in the Share
Economy, FED. TRADE COMM’N BLOGS (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/competition-matters/2014/04/getting-around-town-share-economy
[perma.cc/TQ74-L9KZ].
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D. Case Study: Airbnb and Uber
By far the most prominent sharing services are those based around
accommodations and cars. This Part focuses on the two major
sharing economy companies in these areas, Airbnb and Uber, and it
outlines how the current regulatory landscape is affecting these
companies.

1.

Airbnb

The best-known example in the accommodation sphere is Airbnb,
based in San Francisco. Airbnb was founded in 2008 and is a “trusted
community marketplace for people to list and book unique
accommodations around the world,” either online or on a mobile
phone.87 Airbnb lists more than 2,000,000 listings in more than 34,000
cities and 190 countries.88 People, known as hosts, can list anything
from a spare bed to a castle on the site and set rental rates and house
rules (such as no smoking or pets).89 For facilitating the transaction,
Airbnb takes a nine to fifteen percent commission on the rental fee.90
At less than six years old, the company was already valued around
$13 billion.91
To ensure safety and promote trust, Airbnb does two main things:
it encourages user reviews and facilitates a Verified ID process. For
reviews, hosts and guests can provide up to 500 words describing their
experience.92 After writing a review, if a host or guest has not
completed her review, the person is allowed to edit it for up to fortyeight hours.93 In addition to writing reviews, guests may also submit a
star rating.94 The number of stars displayed on a listing page is an

87. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [perma.cc/4BLP9C28].
88. Id.
89. According to its website, Airbnb lists over 1400 castles. Id.
90. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborativeconsumption-technology-makes-it-easier-people-rent-items [perma.cc/84KQ-397Q].
91. Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee Stock Sale: WSJ,
REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/us-airbnbfinancing-idUSKCN0ID03420141024 [perma.cc/L6YH-8GR5].
92. How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13
[perma.cc/F7A9-KAKX].
93. Id.
94. How
Do
Star
Ratings
Work?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1257/how-do-star-ratings-work
[https://perma.cc/C74V-TXD3].
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aggregate of the scores that different guests have given for that
listing.95
Airbnb will remove or alter a review if it violates its review
guidelines. Review guidelines include sticking to facts and providing
constructive feedback for the host and community.96
Airbnb
discourages personal insults, opinions that are not backed up by
examples, and general unsociable behavior.97
Verified ID works by connecting a user’s Airbnb profile with other
sources of information.98 Airbnb hosts and guests say they look for a
Verified ID badge before deciding to host or stay with someone.99
During the Verified ID process, Airbnb may ask users to: take a
photo or upload an image of a government-issued ID, such as a
driver’s license or passport; connect another online profile to the
Airbnb account, such as a Facebook, Google, or LinkedIn account; or
upload an Airbnb profile photo and provide a phone number and
email address.100
Airbnb also creates a secure payment platform for booking. When
submitting a reservation request to a host, the guest provides payment
details.101 If the reservation request is retracted, declined, or expires,
Airbnb does not complete the charge and any authorization is
released.102 If the reservation is accepted, the payment is processed
and collected by Airbnb in full. Airbnb then holds the payment until
twenty-four hours after check-in, which gives both parties time to do
a walkthrough upon check-in and make sure that everything is as
expected.103
On the guest side, Airbnb provides a Guest Refund Policy if a
guest has a travel issue, such as: (1) a host cancellation shortly before
check-in or failure on the part of the host to provide access to the
listing booked; (2) a misrepresentation of promised amenities or
95. Id.
96. What
Are
the
Airbnb
Review
Guidelines?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/262 [perma.cc/YY72-HBFL].
97. Id.
98. What Is Verified ID?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/450
[perma.cc/DP47-B3JD].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. How
Does
Airbnb
Process
Payments?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/51/how-does-airbnb-process-payments
[https://perma.cc/2SXP-6C6G].
102. See id.
103. When
Will
I
Be
Charged?
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/884/when-will-i-be-charged?topic=220
[https://perma.cc/PQ59-55HG].
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items; or (3) an unclean space. The Guest Refund Policy is available
to all Airbnb guests who have booked on the site, no matter the
destination they are traveling to or their country of residence.104 On
the host side, Airbnb also provides a Host Guarantee, which provides
protection for up to $1,000,000 in damages to an eligible property in
the event of guest damages that cannot be resolved directly with the
guest.105
Despite the measures that Airbnb has taken to ensure a safe and
mutually beneficial exchange between hosts and guests, Airbnb has
been met with resistance by local governments. These legal problems
mostly fall directly on hosts and users, as opposed to the platforms.
This is because Airbnb, like most other sharing platforms, attempts to
shift the risk of liability, by contract, onto its hosts and users. As
written, in all caps, in its terms of service:
THE SITE [AIRBNB], APPLICATION AND SERVICES
COMPRISE AN ONLINE PLATFORM THROUGH WHICH
HOSTS MAY CREATE LISTINGS FOR ACCOMMODATIONS
AND GUESTS MAY LEARN ABOUT AND BOOK
ACCOMMODATIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE HOSTS. YOU
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT AIRBNB IS NOT A
PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN HOSTS AND GUESTS, NOR IS AIRBNB A REAL
ESTATE BROKER, AGENT OR INSURER. AIRBNB HAS NO
CONTROL OVER THE CONDUCT OF HOSTS, GUESTS AND
OTHER USERS OF THE SITE, APPLICATION AND
SERVICES OR ANY ACCOMMODATIONS, AND DISCLAIMS
ALL LIABILITY IN THIS REGARD TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.106

Without a specific statute or regulation, regulators cannot easily
punish the platform, even if the platform users are violating the law or
the scale of the platform disrupts communities.107 Regulators,
therefore, must turn to regulating the hosts and address questions
such as: “Are the new platforms fueling a black market for unsafe
hotels? By bidding up the price of apartments in popular areas, do
104. What
is
the
Guest
Refund
Policy?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/324 [perma.cc/9H8H-KLFZ].
105. Airbnb’s
$1,000,000
Host
Guarantee,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee [perma.cc/MME7-QLS4].
106. Terms
of
Service,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/QTG5-68VL].
107. Cities have tried to fine platforms, but with little success. See, e.g., Edward
Russo, City Fines Uber Over Licensing Violation, REGISTER-GUARD (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/City+fines+Uber+over+licensing+violation.a0395254414 [perma.cc/WUZ4-UXAL].
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short-term rentals make metropolitan areas like New York City less
affordable? Is the influx of out-of-town visitors disturbing residential
neighborhoods?”108
New York City is a hotbed for Airbnb’s challenges. Airbnb
bookings in New York City saw a nearly twelvefold spike in recent
years, rising from 20,808, in 2010, to an estimated 243,019, in 2014.109
New York State asserts that seventy-two percent of Airbnb rentals in
New York City are illegal.110 This is because New York housing law
prohibits an owner or renter from renting her apartment in a Class A
multiple dwelling111 to someone for less than thirty days, unless the
owner or renter is also present.112 Therefore, if a host went away for
the weekend and rented her apartment through Airbnb, the host
would technically be breaking the law, and no permit or license could
make the behavior legal.
The purpose of this prohibition is understandable. It is designed to
protect guests, ensure proper fire and safety code compliance, and
protect permanent residents who would be forced to “endure the
inconvenience of hotel occupancy in their buildings.”113 It is also
designed to preserve the supply of affordable permanent housing.114
In places where it is not outright illegal to participate in Airbnb,
hosts must comply with various regulations. In Austin, Texas, for
example, the city is enforcing new Short-Term Rental Licensing
Ordinances.115 These ordinances require anyone who is leasing their
home, apartment, guest bedroom, or couch on sites like Airbnb to
obtain a license.116 In order to obtain a license, a host is subject to an
inspection and must register with the city, show proof of occupancy,
prove that local hotel occupancy taxes will be paid, and pay a $285
fee.117 However, a host may only obtain a license if the maximum

108. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y.’S RESEARCH DEP’T & INTERNET
BUREAU,
AIRBNB
IN
THE
CITY
1
(2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf [perma.cc/88BH-2RJ7].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. A “multiple dwelling” is a dwelling occupied by three or more families living
independently. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2011). A “Class A”
multiple dwelling is one that is “occupied for permanent residence purposes,” which
includes apartments, co-ops and condos. Id.
112. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4.
113. See N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, S.
6873-B, 233RD LEG. (2010).
114. Id.
115. AUSTIN, TEX., Ordinance 20130926-144 (Sept. 26, 2013).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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number of Short-Term Rentals in the host’s area has not been
exceeded.118 Those who operate without registration risk fines
starting at $500 per night.119
The problem with regulations like the one in Austin is that Airbnb
hosts are operating at such a small scale they simply cannot afford to
satisfy the licensing requirements. As reported by Airbnb in
Portland, Oregon, the typical Airbnb host occasionally rents out only
the property in which he or she lives to help afford costs of living
(sixty-five percent of Portland hosts have used Airbnb to afford their
home), and the typical host earns only $6860 per year in Airbnb
income.120 Furthermore, regulation has proved evasive and has
required costly proactive measures in Austin.121 Similarly, San
Francisco (which has regulations like Austin’s) maintains that
regulations are “unenforceable” without more cooperation from
platforms.122

2.

Uber

Car-sharing schemes divide into peer-to-peer car-rental services in
which you pay to borrow someone else’s car (Buzzcar, Getaround,
Turo, etc.) and taxi-like services (Uber, Lyft, SideCar, etc.) in which
people use their cars to ferry paying passengers. The most popular
company in the taxi-like service realm is Uber. Uber started in San
Francisco, which is notorious for spotty cab service.123 Instead of
hailing a cab the old fashion way, the Uber app originally allowed for
users to request an idling commercial, full-size luxury car to pick them

118. There is a cap on the number of short-term rentals allowed in each census
tract of the city. AUSTIN, TEX., Ordinance 20130926-144; see also Type 2 STR’s by
AUSTINTEXAS.GOV
(Apr.
20,
2015),
PerCent,
https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Type_2_STR_s_by_PerCent-4-202015.pdf [perma.cc/2S8P-PF6S].
119. AUSTIN, TEX., Ordinance 20130926-144.
120. Molly Turner, The Airbnb Community’s Economic Impact in Portland,
AIRBNB (Apr. 22, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-communityseconomic-impact-portland/ [perma.cc/5BUG-7ZVU].
121. Robert Roldan, Other Cities Warn of Airbnb Regulation Pitfalls, COURIER-J.
(Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/money/2015/07/30/cities-warnairbnb-regulation-pitfalls/30896135/?from=global&sessionKey=&autologin=
[perma.cc/5ED6-AA32].
122. See Matier & Ross, ‘No Way of Enforcing’ Airbnb Law, S.F. Planning Memo
Says, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matierross/article/No-way-of-enforcing-Airbnb-law-S-F-planning-6151592.php.
123. Uber—What’s Fueling Uber’s Growth Engine?, GROWTHHACKERS,
https://growthhackers.com/companies/uber/ [perma.cc/VMC3-5JXH].
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up.124 In 2012, Uber launched its “uberX” service,125 which expanded
service to any qualified driver with an acceptable vehicle.126 UberX
drivers can turn on their Uber app whenever they want and receive
eighty percent of the fares.127
With the current version of Uber, passengers open the app and
choose which kind of car service they want (from a standard car to a
limousine). The app then sends the user’s GPS coordinates to nearby
cars. Once a driver is confirmed, which usually happens after a few
seconds, the user is shown the driver’s name, license plate number,
and rating. The user also sees the driver’s route and estimated time
of arrival. Users then tell the driver where to go, and after the user is
dropped off, the user’s credit card is charged and a receipt is emailed
to the user—no cash, not even a tip, is exchanged. Users and drivers
then rate each other, as an incentive to be good customers and
drivers.128
Uber sets the fares for each service in each city based on its own
formula, which is calculated using either a per mile rate or a per
minute rate, on top of a base fare of a few dollars. When demand for
a car is high—during inclement weather or rush hours—customers are
alerted of “surge pricing,” which the company says is a way to
incentivize more drivers to get on the streets to accommodate all
those customers.129
UberX insures passenger safety and well-being in three ways.
First, it conducts “rigorous screening and background checks” on
drivers.130 Second, the company “regularly reviews all feedback,
meaning that we can ensure a safe and respectful environment for all
parties.”131 Third, the company provides end-to-end commercial

124. Edmund Ingham, Start-Ups Take Note: Uber Made It Big, But Did They Get
FORBES
(Dec.
5,
2014),
Right?,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edmundingham/2014/12/05/start-ups-take-note-ubermade-it-big-but-did-they-get-it-right/.
125. Since traditional Uber services like UberBlack and UberTaxi are regulated
like traditional for-hire car services and taxi companies, this Article focuses
exclusively on uberX, which only utilizes individuals with excess capacity.
126. UberX vehicles must be 2008 model cars or newer. Vehicle Requirements,
UBER, http://www.driveubernyc.com/cars/ [perma.cc/4GY4-T6G7].
127. Bill Gurley, A Deeper Look at Uber’s Dynamic Pricing Model (Mar. 12,
2014), http://blog.uber.com/dynamicpricing [perma.cc/SH7X-PUTH].
128. Ride, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/ [https://perma.cc/5N84-NBEJ].
129. Surge pricing multiplies fares during peak demand hours. Id.
130. Nairi Houdajian, Expanded Background Checks, UBER NEWSROOM, (Feb. 12,
2014), https://blog.uber.com/expandedbackgroundchecks [perma.cc/8K2G-QWYC].
131. Erin Griffith, In a Bitter Fight for Customers, Uber and Lyft Begin to SelfDestruct, FORTUNE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/08/13/uber-and-lyft-self-
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liability insurance.132 For the screenings and background checks, all
drivers are screened against the following:


county courthouse records going back seven years for every
county of residence,



federal courthouse records going back seven years,



multi-State Criminal Database going back seven years,



national Sex Offender Registry screen,



lifetime Social Security Trace, and



historical and ongoing Motor Vehicle Records.

In order to pass Uber’s screening test, drivers may not have any of
the following:


DUI or other drug related driving violations,



severe infractions, hit and runs, or fatal accidents,



history of reckless driving,



violent crimes,



sexual offenses,



gun-related violations,



resisting/evading arrest, or



driving without insurance or suspended license charge in the
past three years.133

As for the reviews, Uber drivers are rated on a scale of one to five
stars. According to several Internet sources, Uber will deactivate
drivers if the rating dips below a certain average.134
UberX insures driver safety by providing drivers with feedback on
riders so a driver can make an informed decision about whether or
not to pick up a rider. In addition, if a rider is abusive toward a driver
or otherwise violates Uber’s terms of service, the rider will lose access
to the system.135 UberX also provides contingent liability coverage

destruct-first-sabotage-and-smear-campaigns-now-ratings-bribery/ [perma.cc/29CJ355Y] (quoting Nairi Houdajian, Uber’s communication chief).
132. See Safe Rides, Safer Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/safety
[perma.cc/AU53-LX6U].
133. Details
on
Safety,
UBER
(July
15,
2015),
http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/07/details-on-safety/ [perma.cc/K5QH-SCDZ].
134. See Griffith, supra note 131. The rating has to be higher than a 4.6 or 4.7
according to several online sources (Uber does not release the actual number). See
id.; see also Ansel Herz, Drivers Decry “Predatory” Uber, STRANGER (Apr. 11,
2014), http://www.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2014/04/11/drivers-decry-predatoryuber&view=comments [perma.cc/4EWS-6XHJ].
135. See Safe Rides, Safer Cities, supra note 132.
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when the Uber app is on and the driver is not on a trip, and
commercial insurance when the driver is on a trip.136
Uber is incredibly popular. It provides over 100,000 rides per week
in most major cities and has estimated revenue of between $1.5 and
$2 billion each year.137 At the same time, around the world, taxi
organizations have staged protests and lobbied their local
governments to more strictly regulate companies like Uber.138 In
response, cities have reacted by passing new regulations or enforcing
old ones. For example, Seattle has passed legislation that will limit
the number of ride-sharing drivers from Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar at
any one time.139 An ordinance passed in Chicago places a cap on
surge pricing and requires drivers to complete background checks and
drug tests.140 Other municipalities, such as Philadelphia, have even
gone so far as to impound cars of ride-sharing drivers in an attempt to
discourage this type of activity.141
Some jurisdictions, like New York City, require uberX drivers to
obtain special licenses.142 Licenses are required to make sure that
vehicles carrying the public are properly maintained and operated by
responsible drivers. The requirements can be lengthy—for example,
in order to operate as an uberX143 in New York City, an uberX driver
must provide documentation of the following:

136. See Insurance for UberX with Ridesharing, UBER NEWSROOM (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://blog.uber.com/ridesharinginsurance [perma.cc/R5YC-ZNE4].
137. Alyson Shontell, LEAKED: Internal Uber Deck Reveals Staggering Revenue
and
Growth
Metrics,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Nov.
20,
2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-rides-drivers-and-fares-2014-11.
138. In June 2014, taxi drivers in London, Paris, Madrid, and Berlin organized
strikes to protest against the private-hired cars offered by Uber. Mark Tran, Taxi
Drivers in European Capitals Strike over Uber - as It Happened, GUARDIAN (June
11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/11/taxi-drivers-strike-uberlondon-live-updates [perma.cc/J8SY-B7FH]; see also ACCENTURE, Lead the Pack or
Follow
the
Leader
(2014),
http://www.accenture.com/Microsites/insights/Documents/pdfs/Accenture-SharingEconomy-POV-2.pdf (explaining how Chicago taxi drivers sued the City of Chicago
for violating the Constitution (Fifth Amendment Takings and Equal Protection
Clause) and federal statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1983)).
139. See generally SEATTLE, WASH., Ordinance 124441 (Nov. 30, 2014).
140. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE OF CHI. § 9-115 (2014).
141. Tom Macdonald, Philly Parking Authority Impounds UberX Cars, Vows to
NBC
10
PHILA.
(Oct.
27,
2014),
Continue,
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/traffic/transit/WHYY-Philly-Parking-AuthorityImpounds-UBER-X-Cars-Vows-to-Continue-280559232.html
[perma.cc/DBP6P9B2].
142. See 35 R.C.N.Y. § 55-03 (2015).
143. Most taxi-like services, such as Uber, do not act exactly as taxicabs because,
while the time between ordering an Uber and having the Uber arrive is short, a user
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Zero outstanding judgments to the NYC Taxi & Limousine
Commission, New York State Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) Traffic Violations Bureau, Department of
Finance (DOF) Parking Violations, DOF Red Light Bureau
(i.e., unpaid tickets) and Commercial Motor Vehicles Tax,



Child support certificate,



Current for-hire insurance certificate in the applicant’s
name,



Current insurance declaration page directly from the
insurance company showing the levels of insurance
coverage,



Current DMV registration, bill of sale or leasing agreement,
certificate of origin or certificate of title,



Government issued photo I.D.,



Social Security card, and



Business entity documents.144

In addition, drivers must pay a new application fee of $550, an
inspection fee of $75, and a commercial motor vehicle tax of $800.145
Only upon meeting all such requirements may drivers share their car.
For most transportation microbusinesses, the license requirements
and fees are simply too much to bear. Most Uber drivers are
supplementing income from other sources.146 While they are earning
some money, it is not as much as one might think. Though they
receive roughly eighty percent of the fare that Uber charges, the
drivers are responsible for vehicle financing, tolls, gas, car insurance,
health insurance, retirement, self-employment taxes, and vehicle

is not technically “hailing” a cab from the street. Instead, they are prearranging a
for-hire service, which is often regulated differently than taxis. See Joe Cahill, Why
Uber Doesn’t Deserve Special Treatment, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (July 11, 2014),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140711/BLOGS10/140719976/why-uberdoesnt-deserve-special-treatment [perma.cc/XL9T-C9JV].
144. See 35 R.C.N.Y. § 55-03.
145. N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMO. COMM’N, NEW VEHICLE APPLICATION FHV,
PARATRANSIT
&
COMMUTER
VAN
(2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/vehicle_new_transfer_application.pdf
[perma.cc/HG2C-GXSA].
146. See generally Jonathan Hall & Alan Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor
Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States (Princeton Univ. Indus.
Relations Section, Working Paper No. 587, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uberstatic/comms/PDF/Uber_Driver-Partners_Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf [perma.cc/H4LMX4PU].
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maintenance.147 The Uber driver nets only a few dollars an hour,
according to many Uber drivers.148
II. DEFINING THE SHARING ECONOMY
A. Defining the Sharing Economy
The next step to develop an effective set of regulations for the
sharing economy requires a clear definition of what the sharing
economy is and is not. This section identifies four distinct features of
sharing economy markets. These characteristics include: platforms,
microbusinesses, excess capacity, and high-powered information
exchange.

1.

Platforms

Platforms in the sharing economy enable commercial transactions
by linking sellers of products or services with buyers of those products
or services. These platforms are peer-to-peer in that they are
decentralized on both sides of the platform, in contrast to single-sided
platforms, which follow Coasian149 norms and offer their own
products or services to potential buyers (for example,
Amazon.com).150 The intermediary for the Airbnb network runs the
website.151 The intermediaries for car services such as Uber, Lyft, and
Sidecar create and manage mobile phone applications to connect
drivers to passengers.152
These platforms collect and distill

147. See Peter Ashlock, How Much Money Does an Average Uber or UberX
Driver Earn in a Day?, QUORA (July 17, 2015), http://www.quora.com/How-muchmoney-does-an-average-Uber-or-UberX-driver-earn-in-a-day-What-about-peoplethat-drive-full-time-for-Uber.
148. Id.; see Megan Rose Dickey, Here’s How Much Money You Can Really Earn
BUS.
INSIDER
(June
23,
2015),
as
an
Uber
Driver,
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-you-earn-as-an-uber-driver-2014-6
[perma.cc/E9SW-64TQ] (finding that one uberX driver’s wage averaged out to $4.54
an hour).
149. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937). Coase argued that people organize themselves into firms to avoid the
transaction costs of using the market (e.g. search and information costs, bargaining
costs, keeping trade secrets, and policing and enforcement costs). See id. at 394–98.
150. See Federal Trade Commission, Notice for A Federal Trade Commission
Workshop—The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and
Regulators, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-examinecompetition-consumer-protection-economic-issues-raised-sharing-economy-juneworkshop/150416economyworkshop.pdf [perma.cc/KYH5-CT8X].
151. About Us, supra note 87.
152. Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/W74KJ7SJ].
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information about users to make for open and transparent
interactions.153
Platforms greatly reduce the transaction costs of doing business.154
They standardize the terms of trade, provide a wealth of information
about the markets via sophisticated websites, and facilitate payments.
For example, in the Airbnb network, individual hosts have
outsourced to Airbnb the tasks of determining market demand,
advertising, maintaining a stable supply of customers, and facilitating
payments.155 Without the platform, supply-side users would have to
perform each of these tasks on their own.156 For many people
involved in these networks, the costs of performing such tasks on
their own would be unacceptably cost-prohibitive.157 Platforms also
monitor and sanction participant behavior. Platforms use technology
and feedback systems to monitor and remove users who pose a threat
to consumer well-being or satisfaction.
Platforms are highly involved in many aspects of sharing economy
transactions. This distinguishes them from mere informational
resources such as Craigslist and classified ads. They also can use lex
informatica to control user behaviors; they are thus excellent tools for
regulators.

2.

Microbusinesses

In the sharing economy, platforms are coordinating intermediaries,
and supply-side users are microbusinesses as opposed to employees of
platforms. This distinction helps focus on new approaches to regulate
platforms—as opposed to treating them as traditional firms with
armies of employees.
Platforms view supply-side users as independent contractors
because that classification reduces burdens related to labor and
employment laws—such as unemployment insurance, workers’
compensation, tax responsibilities, etc.. The independent contractor
classification also absolves platforms of liability for harm caused by

153. Id.
154. See generally Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local

Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy”
(George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Paper Series No. 15-01, 2015),
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1501.pdf
[perma.cc/88WH-3GQT].
155. See generally How to Host, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/gettingstarted/how-to-host [perma.cc/M2AY-896P].
156. See Geron, supra note 4.
157. Id.
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peer-to-peer interactions.158 However, because various tests for
distinguishing employees from independent contractors are often
factor tests, it is sometimes unclear exactly where supply-side users
fall on the employee/independent contractor dichotomy.
Pursuant to the common law “right-to-control” test, an agent is an
employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, if the principal
has the right to control the physical details of the work performed by
the agent.159 The principal not only directs the end result, but also
controls how the employee completes the work. Applying this test to
Airbnb, it is easy to argue that hosts control. The platform leaves to
the hosts decisions about how to list and advertise their properties,
how much to charge for rental, whom to choose as renters, the terms
of rental, and even the method of payment.160 If the result of the
contracting relationship between the intermediary and the hosts is to
rent properties for short terms, then this particular sharing network
plainly treats hosts as independent contractors who control the means
and manner of the work.
The broader Restatement test used by some courts to define the
line between employees and independent contractors leads to similar
conclusions.161 Of the ten factors for consideration, factors such as
158. See Kirsner Scott, In the Sharing Economy, a Rift Over Worker
BOS.
GLOBE
(Aug.
17,
2014),
Classification,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/08/16/sharing-economy-are-workersemployees-independent-contractors/6GTpn1a735kNiM7T7k2vtO/story.html.
159. See Viado v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 217 P.3d 199, 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
Several factors [are used to determine] the extent of the right to control: (1)
the independent nature of the person’s business; (2) the person’s obligation
to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and material to perform the job; (3) the
right to control progress of the work, except as to final results; (4) the time
for which the person is employed; and (5) the method of payment, whether
by time or by the job.
Id.; see also Poynor v. BMW of North America, LLC, 441 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. App.
2013).
160. See
generally
Hosting
Standards,
AIRBNB
https://www.airbnb.com/help/topic/206/hosting-standards [perma.cc/B2Z3-5RE8].
161. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST.
1958). The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 uses ten factors for determining
whether an agent is an independent contractor or an employee:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill
required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the
workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is
employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

60

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

control, whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business (the platform is a technology company, the other is akin to
an innkeeper), the place of work, the length of time agent is
employed, the method of payment (by task instead of by time), and
belief of the parties all suggest an independent contractor
relationship.162
For taxi-like services, such as Uber, the analysis is much less
clear.163 Uber remains steadfast in its claim that drivers hold
independent contractor status. On the sign-up page for potential
drivers to join Uber, the wording is unmistakable: “Drive with Uber

and earn great money as an independent contractor. Get paid weekly
just for helping our community of riders get rides around town. Be
your own boss and get paid in fares for driving on your own
schedule.”164
Uber spokesman, Taylor Bennett, further clarified Uber’s position
on driver classification when he stated: “They’re independent
contractors. We don’t hire drivers. We’re a technology company.
We provide the app that they use, that connects passengers with
drivers. They have the flexibility of being their own boss.”165 Uber
drivers are indeed entirely flexible as to when he or she chooses to
work (as long as they give at least one ride every 180 days on uberX
or every 30 days on UberBlack).166 In addition, they never have to
accept any requests for rides Uber generates, and they can completely
control how they get from point A to point B for the rides they do
accept.167 However, Uber does instruct drivers on how to interact
with passengers, the prices to be charged (including the controversial

(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in
business.

Id.
162. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52
(1989).
163. See Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy:
Square Pegs Trying to Fit in Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53.
164. Drive, UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/ [perma.cc/DS8G-2FCY].
165. Yani Crespo, Uber Drivers: Employees or Independent Contractors?, U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. (Feb. 27, 2015), http://business-law-review.law.miami.edu/uberemployees-independent-contractors/ [perma.cc/62CR-6GAP].
166. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
167. Id.
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surge pricing system),168 the terms and forms of payment, and the type
and look of their vehicles.169 It also has a system by which passengers
can rate drivers—with a consequence of “deactivation” for drivers
whose ratings fall below a certain level.170 In short, Uber manages
many more aspects of the means and manner of the work performed
by the drivers. Not surprisingly, many of the factors comprising the
more fact-sensitive agency test also point in the direction of treating
Uber’s drivers as employees rather than independent contractors.171
Instead of classifying Uber drivers and other supply-side users in
the sharing economy as either employees or independent contractors,
regulators should create a new classification.172 This new classification
has been identified as “dependent contractors,” or for the purposes of

168. See generally Annie Lowrey, Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of HighN.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Jan.
10
2014),
Gouging?,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-an-example-ofhigh-tech-gouging.html.
169. Alison Griswold, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Trial That Could
SLATE
(Mar.
12,
2015),
Devastate
the
“Sharing
Economy,”
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/03/12/uber_lyft_employment_cases_juries
_could_decide_the_legal_fate_of_the_sharing.html [perma.cc/6ZQF-9CFV].
170. Id.
171. U.S. District Court judges in San Francisco have recently ruled on two cases
that could change the sharing economy landscape. See Griswold, supra note 164.
These separate cases were brought in class-action status against Uber and Lyft on
behalf of drivers who contend that they should be considered employees. Id. Both
companies were hoping that the courts would issue summary judgment orders,
maintaining independent contractor status for the drivers of each company. Id.
However, both courts concluded that the law was too ambiguous for them to decide
and that each case must proceed to a jury ruling within the California legal system.

Tech

Id.
In addition, the California Labor Commission recently classified Uber drivers
as employees. Alison Griswold, A California Labor Ruling Just Said an Uber Driver
Is an Employee. That’s Uber’s Worst Nightmare., SLATE (June 17, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/06/17/uber_drivers_ruled_employees_by_
california_labor_commission.html [perma.cc/JY6X-3PAD].
“‘Defendants hold
themselves out as nothing more than a neutral technological platform, designed
simply to enable drivers and passengers to transact the business of transportation,’
the commission writes. ‘The reality, however, is that Defendants are involved in
every aspect of the operation.’” Id. The labor commission noted that Uber vets
prospective drivers, maintains quality control procedures for both passengers and
drivers, such as a rating system, and that Uber had “all necessary control over the
operation as a whole.” Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Lab. Commission 2015), http://lawweb.pace.edu/library/ubercase.pdf
[perma.cc/2PH2-T927].
172. Some scholars argue that using a twentieth century to test to classify workers
in the twenty-first century economy is inappropriate. See Sprague, supra note 158, at
21; cf. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The test the
California courts have developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn’t
very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem.”).
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this Article “microbusinesses”—workers who fall between clear-cut
employees and traditional independent contractors.173 This new
classification would enable regulators to think differently about how
to fill regulatory gaps. They might, for example, find it more useful to
focus on regulating platforms because they are dependent on the
supply-side users.

3.

Excess Capacity

Another distinguishing feature of the sharing economy is its
utilization of excess capacity.174 Manufacturers use the term “excess
capacity” to refer to “an underutilized asset that is not being fully
exploited to create value, be it an idle assembly line or a factory
running only one shift when it could potentially be running two or
three.”175 In the sharing economy, people have excess capacity in
their things, space, and time, and it is this excess capacity that supplyside users are monetizing for their own benefit.176 For the most part,
microbusiness are not acquiring new assets to leverage or sell.177
This excess capacity feature of the sharing economy is a fickle one,
especially as more and more users of sharing economy platforms are
putting new assets online and forming traditional hotels, cleaning
services, etc. If supply-side users are hiring employees, purchasing
space and assets, and using sharing economy platforms to sell them,
they are acting more like traditional firms and should be treated as
such. If platforms want a new regulatory framework to apply to
them, they must carefully filter out traditional firms from
microbusinesses. For example, in order to distinguish a site like
173. Harry Williams Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal
Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 89 (1965) (developing the
term “dependent contractor”). Other countries, including Canada and Germany,
already have labor laws covering this type of employment. See id.
174. The definition of the sharing economy should only include people utilizing
their excess capacity. Currently, “superusers” exploit sharing economy platforms to
effectively operate traditional businesses. For example, a report by New York State
Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, found that almost half of Airbnb’s $1.45
million revenue from New York City in 2010 came from hosts who had at least three
listings on the site. See NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 103, at
10. There were only 119 of these users, a small minority, claiming a large share of the
business. Id. These superusers should not be considered part of the sharing economy
because they are creating new capacity rather than efficiently using excess capacity,
and they are unfairly competing with the non-sharing industry economy players. Id.
175. TRIPLEPUNDIT.COM, THE RISE OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 20 (2013),
http://www.triplepundit.com/uploads/The_Rise_of_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf
[perma.cc/5BY8-GQYB].
176. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 59, at 11.
177. See id. at 14.
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Airbnb from an online travel agent (such as Expedia), participation
must be limited to microbusinesses with individual excess capacity.
This is possible with technology, but this issue is by far one of the
most fluid aspects of the sharing economy that needs clear definition.

4.

High-Powered Information Exchange

As described above, technology is essential for high-powered
information exchange in sharing economy markets.178 Participants in
the sharing economy upload information to sharing economy
platforms (personal information, credit card data, product and service
availability, etc.) so that supply-side users and consumers can quickly
be matched for their specific transaction. With the sharing economy,
there is a constant free-flow exchange of information.
The characteristics discussed in this Part define sharing businesses
and demonstrate how the behaviors in the sharing economy are
qualitatively different than traditional firms. To oversimplify, these
features are also what current regulations ignore. While it is possible
to find many businesses that are similar to sharing economy platforms
(Craigslist, Tupperware, FedEx, etc.), none incorporate all four
dimensions—platforms, microbusinesses, excess capacity, and
technology.
To the contrary, non-sharing economy firms are
traditional in most respects, such as form of organization, ownership
of business assets, and internalized use of information to leverage
assets for a profit.179
B.

The Sharing Economy’s Current Regulatory Landscape

Periodically, our society generates “disruptive innovations” like the
Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen
sharing economy.180
introduced the idea of disruptive innovations to describe technologies
that undermine and eventually displace established products, firms, or
even entire industries.181 Classic examples include automobiles,

178. See supra Part I.A.II.
179. See, e.g., Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 154, at 11–13; Boyd Cohen & Jan
Kietzmann, Ride On! Mobility Business Models for the Sharing Economy, 27 ORG. &
ENV’T 279, 283 (2014); Geron, supra note 4.
180. See Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies:
Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 45. Bower and Christensen
did not discuss the term “disruptive innovation” in their 1995 article, but
Christensen’s follow-up book helped introduce and popularize the term. See
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
181. See Bower & Christensen, supra note 180, at 45.
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personal computing, and cellular phones.182 The sharing economy is
not only considered by many to be a disruptive innovation,183 but it is
also, in the words of Nathan Cortez, creating a “regulatory
disruption.”184
Currently, cities and towns across the United States are taking one
of three general approaches to regulate the sharing economy. The
first approach involves banning platforms outright. This has been
particularly true for ride-sharing platforms, such as Uber and Lyft,
and house-sharing platforms, such as Airbnb, in many cities
throughout the United States.185 The second approach involves
authorities imposing regulatory structures designed for non-sharing
economy businesses. These structures are very often ill-fitted for the
specifics of the sharing economy and, as a result, regulators enforce
those regulations sporadically—turning a blind eye in some instances
and enforcing rules in others.186 Authorities taking a novel approach
work with platforms directly to reach some sort of common ground.
For example, the California Public Utility Commission worked with
several ride-sharing companies to develop new regulations for the
industry.187
There are significant problems with each approach. The first
approach—the outright ban of the platforms—cuts off the potential
economic and environmental benefits of the sharing economy. The
second—imposing ill-fitting regulations or turning a blind eye—is not

182. See id. at 50.
183. See GROWTHHACKERS, supra note 118 (citing Uber as an example of a “truly
disruptive idea[] that completely redefine[s] an industry”).
184. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
175, 177 (2014).
185. See Kulikowski, supra note 11 (citing examples of cities that have banned
Uber, such as Little Rock, AK; Las Vegas, NV; and Portland, OR); see also Robert
McClendon & Katherine Sayre, New Orleans Confronts Unlicensed Short Term
Rentals: To Legalize or Keep Ban?, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 3, 2014),
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2014/06/new_orleans_confronts_controve.htm
l [perma.cc/5FY3-Q79S] (explaining that in New Orleans and many other cities, it is
illegal to provide unlicensed short rentals).
186. See Ron Lieber, supra note 13 (explaining that in New York, Airbnb
investigations appeared to only occur in apartments where neighbors have
complained).
187. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, CPUC Establishes Rules for
Transportation Network Companies (Sept. 19, 2013) (on file with author),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K132/77132276.pdf
[perma.cc/R56J-CDXL] (explaining that in California, ride-sharing companies are
now called “transportation network companies,” and they must comply with twentyeight insurance and safety requirements in order to operate).
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sustainable, puts consumers at risk, and gives supply-side users188 an
unfair advantage over traditional industries. As Airbnb founder
Nathan Blecharczyk states, “we’re not advocating that there shouldn’t
be rules. We’re just saying that things have evolved and it’s worth
taking a fresh look from the ground up.”189 The third, novel approach
is often reactionary and piecemeal, because these new regulations are
not grounded in a clear conceptual understanding of what the sharing
economy is. The sharing economy must be viewed as a new form of
market driven by technology and be regulated as such.190
III. A NEW ECONOMY, A NEW FRAMEWORK
Under the traditional “public interest theory” of regulation,
regulation is sought to protect consumers from structural problems
known as market failures.191 These structural problems can include
inadequate competition, uncompensated negative externalities,192
asymmetrical information,193 and unequal bargaining power.194 When
market failures occur, regulation may be supplied as a corrective
measure.195 For example, cities in the United States have been
regulating taxicabs with safety, insurance, and service standards since
the 1920s in response to the early days of dangerous cars and

188. “Supply-side users” refers to the individuals selling their excess capacity as
opposed to the consumers who purchase that excess capacity. This Article argues
that these supply-side users should be considered “microbusinesses” rather than
employees of sharing economy platforms.
189. Greg Rosalsky, Regulate This! A New Freakonomics Radio Podcast,
FREAKONOMICS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://freakonomics.com/2014/09/04/regulate-this-anew-freakonomics-radio-podcast/ [perma.cc/LUR5-9PWB].
190. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an
Alternative Capitalist System, 90 Tul. L. Rev. 241 (2015). As discussed below, this
argument builds on the work of Rashmi Dyal-Chand.
191. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS VOL. 1 (1971).
192. A considerable amount of regulation is justified on the ground that the
unregulated price of a good does not reflect the true cost to society of producing the
good. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (Harvard University
Press, 1982).
193. For a competitive market to function well, buyers must have sufficient
information to evaluate competing products. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 525 (1945).
194. See STEPHEN BREYER, supra note 192, at 15–35.
195. The “public interest theory” of regulation posits that regulation emerges in
situations of market failure as a response to public demand. See Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 335–36 (1974).
The “capture theory” of regulation posits that, over time, governmental regulation is
supplied to serve the interests of the regulated industries. See id.
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inadequate compensation for accident victims.196 To address market
failures in the new sharing economy, regulators must find a coherent
path between no regulations at all and the imposition of ill-fitted
regulations from the non-sharing sector.
Why should the sharing economy be permitted to play by different
rules? The sharing economy serves a very positive role in society.
First, the sharing economy is more efficient than traditional
businesses. As described above, it allows for existing resources of
individuals to be put to their best use with zero-marginal costs.197 This
is a meaningful attribute of the sharing economy because it creates a
sustainable use of resources. Second, the sharing economy provides
great benefits for the economy, because it allows microbusinesses to
profit from existing resources. Third, allowing the sharing economy
to continue to grow and evolve has the potential to bring unforeseen
benefits. As argued by Sofia Ranchordas, the sharing economy needs
to be regulated in an “innovation-friendly” way, meaning that it must
be regulated in a transparent, consistent, and flexible way.198 The
social benefits of innovations for the growth and development of a
country are indisputable.199 In the last decade, different social and
technological innovations have contributed substantially to the
improvement of living standards and enhanced the diversity, quality,
and safety of products in the market.200
Although the benefits of the sharing economy justify “special
treatment,” this new structure must still serve the desired ends of
regulation. The section below describes the means to serve those
ends by regulating platforms instead of supply-side and end-users.
A. Platform Regulation to Prevent Fraud and Promote Safety
Issues of fraud prevention and safety are of the upmost importance
to regulators. However, instead of requiring a complex compliance
structure for supply-side users, we should place responsibility on the
platforms to ensure against fraud and unnecessary dangers. Placing
non-delegable responsibilities on platforms will encourage platforms

196. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation &
Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 76–77 (1996).
197. See supra Section I.B.
198. Sofia Ranchordás, Innovation-Friendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation,
the Sunrise of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 223 (2015).
199. Id. at 208.
200. Robert Cooter, et al., The Importance of Law Promoting Innovation and
Growth, RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH
LEGAL REFORM 1–2 (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation ed., 2011).
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to better screen participants, inspect shared assets, and regulate
supply-side use.201
In addition, placing non-delegable responsibilities on platforms will
encourage platforms to maintain accurate feedback systems so they
are less likely to be improperly manipulated or hacked. If the
feedback systems are accurate, then modern trust will guide user
decisions and help the sharing economy naturally regulate itself...
Users of the sharing economy are already operating under a system of
modern trust that does not require the traditional safeguards that
licensing statutes and other regulations create. For example, an
Airbnb guest looking for a place to stay would likely refuse to select
an unrated Airbnb host; instead, she would select a host that has been
reviewed many times by the community.
Methods for keeping the feedback system accurate include:
creating a consistent rating mechanism that allows for written
comments, providing users with a meaningful opportunity to respond
to feedback, providing a moderator to censor inappropriate or
“unfair” feedback (similar to Airbnb’s system), and implementing an
algorithm that helps scrub the data for confederate reviews (similar to
the system used by review sites such as Tripadvisor and Yelp).202
B.

Platform Regulation to Generate Tax Revenue

Solving regulators’ revenue woes is quite simple: require the
platforms to collect and pay taxes. There are two reasons supply-side
users of the sharing economy avoid paying taxes. The first reason is
because it is easy to underreport in peer-to-peer transactions,
especially for state taxes, such as sales and innkeepers taxes.203
Second, as suggested by Airbnb founder Nathan Blecharcyk, a lot of
hosts are afraid to pay taxes because they fear that if they pay the tax,

201. For example, Uber could limit the number of hours a driver could be on the
app—to prevent a driver from driving while tired.
202. See, e.g., Michael Luca & Georgios Zervas, Fake It Till You Make It:
Reputation, Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
14-006,
2015),
http://people.hbs.edu/mluca/Papers%20on%20RIS/FakeItTillYouMakeIt.pdf
[perma.cc/5MRH-YZUU] (finding that sixteen percent of Yelp reviews are removed
for inauthenticity).
203. Many platforms provide supply-side users with 1099s. For example, Uber
sends drivers a Form 1099, rather than the Form W-2 used for employees. See Sign
Up To Drive With Uber, UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/financing/ [perma.cc/XE59YHZH] (“We’ll send you a 1099 form that you will use to report the income you
made driving with Uber.”).
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they will give away their identity and will be punished for violating a
short-term rental law.204
Both of these reasons for underreporting would be eliminated if
platforms were required to pay appropriate taxes in addition to filing
1099s. Furthermore, it appears that platforms are willing to pay taxes.
For example, Airbnb began collecting a fourteen percent Transient
Occupancy Tax in San Francisco in October of 2014, and Uber
collects taxes when required by law.205
C.

Platform Regulation to Allocate Risk

Regulations designed to allocate risk in the traditional economy
often fail to efficiently serve the sharing economy goals. One
traditional regulatory mechanism to allocate risk—the requirement to
carry insurance—presents a unique problem when applied to players
in the sharing economy. When there are multiple players in the
execution of the “sharing” of an asset, who should be obligated to
insure against liability arising out of that sharing: the supply-side
provider, the platform operator, or the user? Moreover, if a supplyside provider is using a traditionally private asset for commercial gain,
does traditional insurance provide coverage?
App-based ride services have been at the center of such questions
recently. In California, for example, district attorneys are
complaining to state regulators that, because drivers’ private
insurance policies typically exclude coverage for commercial use of
their vehicles, the platform essentially encourages insurance fraud.206
In short, drivers are incentivized to lie if they get into an accident, by
claiming they were driving for personal reasons. Generally, the
carriers for the private drivers have no way to detect this type of
fraud.207
Once again, the regulatory goal of risk allocation can be met in this
instance by regulating the platform. Platform operators, which are
already beginning to voluntarily provide insurance for platformrelated liability, could be required to provide primary insurance for

204. See Rosalsky, supra note 189.
205. See Dara Kerr, Airbnb Begins Collecting 14% Hotel Tax in San Francisco,
CNET (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-begins-collecting-14-hoteltax-in-san-francisco/ [perma.cc/CN3J-WHY4]; see also Terms, UBER (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms [perma.cc/7WS7-XH5K] .
206. Carolyn Said, Drivers for Ride-App Services Accused of Fraud, SFGATE
(Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Drivers-for-ride-app-servicesaccused-of-fraud-5339357.php.
207. Id.
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platform-related activity. Furthermore, the platform could be
required to mandate that its users report all accidents arising out of
commercial activity to the platform. Under such a structure,
incentives to commit insurance fraud are eliminated, and any increase
in cost to the platform can simply be accommodated in the
fee/commission structure, thereby allowing the market to more
appropriately allocate risk.

D. Platform Regulation to Ensure Fair Competition
From taxi drivers to hoteliers, many traditional businesses have
argued that the sharing economy creates an unfair playing field.208
Specifically, some individual supply-side-platform users are using the
platforms on such a scale that they actually look like their non-sharing
economy counterparts. For example, according to the office of the
New York State Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, almost half
of Airbnb’s $1.45 million in 2010 revenue in New York City came
from hosts who had at least three listings on the site.209 There were
only 119 of these users, a small minority, claiming a large share of the
These “superusers” are effectively operating like
business.210
traditional businesses because they are developing new capacity, as
opposed to utilizing excess capacity, and are truly exploiting the
system.
If, in response to these well-founded complaints, regulators simply
imposed the existing regulatory structure on the sharing economy
participants, the benefits of the sharing economy would be stifled. If,
on the other hand, no regulations are imposed, the unfair competition
precipitated by the large-scale use of the platforms will be allowed to
continue. Again, the balance can be best struck by a middle road
solution—rules that serve regulatory goals without compromising
sharing economy benefits. In this case, to avoid the platform
“superuser” problem, regulators should require platforms to limit the
scale of use of their services by any individual member. For example,
Airbnb could be required to limit the number of listings a single user
can put online to one or two. By doing so, no single user will be able

208. Patrick Marshall, The Sharing Economy, SAGE BUS. RESEARCHER (Aug. 3,
2015), http://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr-1645-96738-2690068/20150803/thesharing-economy [perma.cc/9Q3P-U35U].
209. See OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y.’S RESEARCH DEP’T &
INTERNET BUREAU, supra note 108, at 10.
210. See id.
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to manipulate the system by “creating” new capacity rather than
efficiently using excess capacity and unfairly competing with the nonsharing economy players.
CONCLUSION
The sharing economy is here to stay. As Marcus Wohlsen from

Wired Magazine observes, the sharing economy is reaching a point
where it is becoming “too big to ban.”211 Uber and other sharing
platforms have prioritized popularity over profit in order to grow, and
they believe if the sharing economy gets big enough quickly enough,
the political price will become too high for any elected official to try
to stop it.212 And they are not wrong; people, especially millennials,
embrace the sharing economy.
The sharing economy needs to be regulated, but it needs to be
regulated in a smart and novel way that allows people to share
resources and utilize modern trust without compromising fraud
prevention, safety, fair competition, and other regulatory goals.213
Regulators will always be confronted with new products,
technologies, and business practices that fall within their jurisdiction
but do not fit comfortably within their existing regulatory
frameworks. In the face of regulatory disruption, regulators should be
flexible and willing to promote innovation with clear and consistent
rules. In the case of the sharing economy, they must learn about and
embrace the sharing economy’s unique features and utilize platforms
to accomplish regulatory goals.

211. Marcus Wohlsen, Uber’s Brilliant Strategy to Make Itself Too Big to Ban,
WIRED (July 8, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-tomake-itself-too-big-to-ban/ [perma.cc/4MYT-JXDQ].
212. Id.
213. Other concerns of regulators not specifically addressed in this Article, such as
protecting protected classes from discrimination and promoting community order
and organization (especially through regulations such as zoning laws and affordable
housing laws), still need to be analyzed and addressed.

